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Abstract 
We recently described a dynamic causal model of a COVID-19 outbreak within a single region. Here, we combine 
several of these (epidemic) models to create a (pandemic) model of viral spread among regions. Our focus is on a 
second wave of new cases that may result from loss of immunity—and the exchange of people between regions—and 
how mortality rates can be ameliorated under different strategic responses. In particular, we consider hard or soft 
social distancing strategies predicated on national (Federal) or regional (State) estimates of the prevalence of infection 
in the population. The modelling is demonstrated using timeseries of new cases and deaths from the United States to 
estimate the parameters of a factorial (compartmental) epidemiological model of each State and, crucially, coupling 
between States. Using Bayesian model reduction, we identify the effective connectivity between States that best 
explains the initial phases of the outbreak in the United States. Using the ensuing posterior parameter estimates, we 
then evaluate the likely outcomes of different policies in terms of mortality, working days lost due to lockdown and 
demands upon critical care. The provisional results of this modelling suggest that social distancing and loss of 
immunity are the two key factors that underwrite a return to endemic equilibrium. 
Key words: coronavirus; epidemiology; compartmental models; dynamic causal modelling; variational; Bayesian 
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Introduction 
 
This technical report describes a dynamic causal model of how COVID-19 spreads among regions by 
combining multiple models of an epidemic within a single region. This (epidemic) model was introduced 
recently to showcase the potential of variational Bayesian procedures in fitting mechanistic or generative 
models of an epidemic to measurable outcomes (Friston et al., 2020).  
 
Mechanistic or generative models enable forecasting based upon epidemiological parameters estimated 
from empirical data (Wu et al., 2020), e.g., serial interval estimates (Nishiura et al., 2020; Yang et al., 2020). 
Models of this sort have been applied to the initial outbreak in Wuhan, China (Sun et al., 2020; Wang et 
al., 2020a; Wang et al., 2020c) to predict new cases or clinical resources (Moghadas et al., 2020) and the 
effects of various interventions (Prem et al., 2020; Wells et al., 2020). Such models are invaluable when 
predicting the demand for critical care (Ferguson et al., 2020; Moghadas et al., 2020). The particular 
contribution of this report is to illustrate the use of variational procedures to compare different models of 
the same data—and the inherent latitude for building large multifactorial models that can handle different 
kinds of outcomes. 
 
The (dynamic causal) model (DCM) used in this report has a degree of predictive validity (Friston et al., 
2020) and Bayesian model comparison suggests that it provides a simpler and more accurate account than 
equivalent single factor (e.g., SEIR) models (Moran et al., 2020). However, the DCM only considered a 
single outbreak in a single region and therefore precluded epidemiological trajectories that feature things 
like second waves. In this technical report1, we build upon this epidemic model to create a pandemic model 
 
1 This technical report is a follow-up to an original report prepared in anticipation of the RAMP (Rapid Assistance in 
Modelling the Pandemic) initiative (https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/Health-and-wellbeing/ramp/). It should 
be read as a proof of concept whose main aim is didactic; namely, to explain how variational procedures enable 
highly parameterised compartmental models to be inverted and compared quickly and efficiently. As such, it 
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that comprises multiple epidemic (single region) models. In what follows, we apply this model to explain 
regional timeseries from the United States, treating each State as a region and modelling the exchange of 
people—who may or may not be infected—among States. Our focus is on the interplay between regional 
outbreaks in the evolution of the pandemic and how this evolution informs strategic responses, such as 
social distancing. Models of the international spread of COVID-19—such as the Global Epidemic and 
Mobility Model (GLEAM)—usually partition the world into regions centred on major transportation hubs 
(e.g., airports). These regions are then connected by the flux of people travelling daily among them 
(Chinazzi et al., 2020). See also (Steven et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020). In what follows, we apply the same 
idea to daily travel between the United States of America, equipping each State with its own epidemiology 
that becomes coupled through reciprocal exchange of their denizens. This creates a loosely coupled 
(nonlinear) oscillator model, of the sort that is used widely in other settings: e.g., (Jafri et al., 2016; Kaluza 
and Meyer-Ortmanns, 2010; Ladenbauer and Obermayer, 2019; Lizarazu et al., 2019; Schumacher et al., 
2015). 
 
Often, the first wave of a pandemic, so-called “herald waves” (Simonsen et al., 2018), are followed some 
months later by a second or third waves of infection (see Figure 1) that may, in some instances, be more 
severe than the first, such as those seen in the influenza pandemics of 1918 (H1H1), 1957 (H2H2), 1968 
(H3N2), and 2009 (H1N1). If one commits to the idea that a generative model of measurable outcomes is 
necessary to properly predict systemic dynamics, then the natural question is: what causes a second wave? 
One answer is that a regional population is re-exposed to infection by an influx of infected people from 
another—that may itself have been caused by the first. Clearly, the degree to which an outbreak in another 
region induces a second wave in the first will depend sensitively on the level of herd immunity inherited 
from the first wave. It is therefore important to consider the degree to which herd immunity is lost following 
the first wave; either through an endogenous loss of immunity within the first population or a renewal of 
that population with people who are not immune. For example, about 0.5% of the American population 
move between States every day2. This movement ‘mixes’ the total population, with consequent loss of herd 
immunity. 
 
Heuristically, the picture that emerges can be likened to a Californian or Australian wildfire with embers 
seeded throughout a large territory. One ember may gain a sufficient hold to cause the first flareup and 
become the epicentre of a bushfire. As the fire rages through the locale, consuming combustible material, 
it will eventually burn itself out. However, if the right conditions prevail—and embers are carried to another 
locale—a second fire will start and thereby elicit a chain of fires. In this analogy, the second wave 
corresponds to a reignition of the first by embers from the second. However, there is a natural fire retardant 
in the first locale (i.e., herd immunity) that offers some protection (i.e., there is nothing left to burn). 
 
provides the technical details that allow people to reproduce the modelling at home. Alternatively, it could 
complement epidemiological modelling with Approximate Bayesian Computation. Although the authors of the 
current report are involved in the clinical management of COVID-19 patients—and are experts in biological 
timeseries modelling—they are not virologists or epidemiologists. As such, the validity of the model described in this 
report may or may not be endorsed by experts in the appropriate fields. 
2  According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (http://www.transtats.bts.gov/), a total of 631,939,829 
passengers boarded domestic flights in the United States in the year 2010. This corresponds to 1.73 million passenger 
flights per day. The population of the United States is about 327.2 million; a ratio of 190. 
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Crucially, this protection will decline over time as new growth furnishes more combustible material (i.e., a 
loss of immunity). So, what causes a second wave—is it the recursive spread of the fire (i.e., pandemic) or 
is it susceptibility to reignition (i.e., herd immunity)? 
 
These considerations highlight the importance of herd immunity and the factors that underwrite resistance 
to infection. After the first wave, immunity in any given population may be lost for several reasons. These 
include a natural loss of immunity of the sort seen in seasonal influenza—mediated by viral mutation or the 
prevalence of different viral serotypes. For COVID-19, this is an area of active research that has yet to 
provide definitive answers. However, empirical evidence suggests that neutralising antibodies to COVID-
19 can be raised fairly quickly (Bao et al., 2020; Bendavid et al., 2020; Chan et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
instances of reinfection are sufficiently low to suggest that immunity to COVID-19 may be long lasting, at 
least over a period of months. Furthermore, studies in nonhuman primates suggest it is difficult to elicit the 
symptoms of COVID-19 after an initial infection (Bao et al., 2020)3. However, this does not necessarily 
guarantee an enduring herd immunity. 
 
The transmission of SARS-CoV-2 depends on many factors, including seasonal variation in transmission 
strength, the duration of immunity, and cross-immunity with other coronaviruses. SARS-CoV-2 belongs to 
the betacoronavirus genus, which includes the SARS, MERS, and two other human coronaviruses, HCoV-
OC43 and HCoV-HKU1 (Kissler et al., 2020; Su et al., 2016). HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1 infections 
may be asymptomatic or produce mild to moderate upper respiratory tract symptoms; namely, a common 
cold (Kissler et al., 2020). Accumulating evidence suggests that primary SARS-CoV-2 infection causes a 
mild illness in the majority of cases with a minority progressing to severe lower respiratory infection, 
interstitial pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and multiple organ failure. The primary 
infections may also be further complicated by additional insults, such as secondary bacterial infections or 
thromboembolic events4. Immunity to HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1 appears to be lost over a few 
months. However, betacoronaviruses can induce immune responses against each another. For example, 
SARS can generate neutralizing antibodies against HCoV-OC43 that can endure for years (Chan et al., 
2013), while HCoV-OC43 infection can generate cross-reactive antibodies against SARS (Chan et al., 
2013). Now, the question is: does SARS-CoV-2 behave like SARS, conveying long-lasting immunity or 
does it behave like HCoV-OC43, conferring immunity for just a few months? In what follows, we will 
consider both scenarios and the implications for how we live with COVID-19—or not. 
 
This report tries to characterise the interplay between population fluxes and the waning of immunity using 
a compartmental model of ensemble dynamics. Typically, these kinds of models employ a sparse coupling 
 
3 After seroconversion, asymptomatic monkeys were challenged with a second dose of SARS-CoV-2. Neither viral 
loads in nasopharyngeal and anal swabs nor viral replication in primary tissue compartments was evident in re-
exposed monkeys. On the basis of follow-up virologic, radiological and pathological assessment, monkeys with re-
exposure showed no recurrence of COVID-19. Bao, L., Deng, W., Gao, H., Xiao, C., Liu, J., Xue, J., Lv, Q., Liu, J., Yu, P., 
Xu, Y., Qi, F., Qu, Y., Li, F., Xiang, Z., Yu, H., Gong, S., Liu, M., Wang, G., Wang, S., Song, Z., Zhao, W., Han, Y., Zhao, L., 
Liu, X., Wei, Q., Qin, C., 2020. Reinfection could not occur in SARS-CoV-2 infected rhesus macaques. bioRxiv, 
2020.2003.2013.990226. 
4 See https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/how-does-coronavirus-kill-clinicians-trace-ferocious-rampage-
through-body-brain-toes for an accessible summary of COVID-19’s reach beyond the lungs. 
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between nonlinear systems (here a compartmental model of a regional outbreak). In the present setting, the 
sparse coupling is a small exchange of people between States that can be parameterised in terms of the daily 
probability that ‘I will leave one State for another’. Clearly, this will depend upon whether I can leave 
home, which depends upon any social distancing currently in play.  
 
This brings us to the second focus of the current modelling; namely, how does social distancing mitigate 
interregional influences? To answer this question, one has to have a formal model of social distancing. 
There are two attributes of any social distancing—its functional form and its argument, i.e., what is social 
distancing a function of? In what follows, we consider functional forms based on dual criteria: namely, the 
prevalence of measurable infection, and demand upon critical care. In brief, these functions can be regarded 
as adaptive strategies. In other words, they are social distancing responses to changes in measurable 
quantities. These responses may be mediated via governmental advice, social media, behavioural 
dispositions, and other affordances 5  that we can lump together in terms of a propensity to avoid 
interpersonal contact—or not.  
 
We will consider two threshold-based responses to the prevalence of infection in the population. This 
prevalence is fairly straightforward to estimate on the basis of currently available tests for the presence of 
the virus on mucosa. This does not require exhaustive or comprehensive testing; provided these measures 
are modelled appropriately (e.g., using a generative model of the sort considered below). Although offering 
a straightforward model of social distancing there remains an outstanding issue: do I (or the government) 
base my social distancing on the prevalence of infection in my region, or is it driven by the experience of 
other regions in my country. In other words, should social distancing be based upon regional or national 
criteria, and therefore enacted at a regional or national level? In what follows, we fit a pandemic model to 
regional data from the United States and ask what would happen if a national (i.e., Federal) social distancing 
strategy was adopted, as opposed to a regional (i.e., State) approach. 
 
This report comprises three sections. The first rehearses the dynamic causal model presented previously, 
with an emphasis on the extension to multiple regions—and implicit coupling among regions. The second 
section presents the results of model fitting to timeseries from States in America6. This section considers 
the sensitivity of cumulative deaths to various model parameters, with a focus on the connectivity among 
States that shapes the overall progression of the pandemic. The final section considers social distancing 
strategies by simulating what would happen under regional and national approaches, with hard (e.g., 
lockdown) and soft (e.g., partial) social distancing. 
 
 
 
5 In the sense of Gibson, J.J., 1977. The theory of affordances, in: R, S., Bransford, J. (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and 
knowing: Toward an ecological psychology. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 67-82. For example, seeing the person on 
the pavement affords the opportunity to circumnavigate them by 6 feet. 
6 Available from https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Figure 1: second waves in China. This figure illustrates a secondary wave of new cases in reports from China. The 
dots represent empirical records of new cases and deaths as a function of weeks from the onset of the outbreak. The 
lines correspond to the predicted incidences, under a (single region) model described in (Friston et al., 2020). These 
data are presented to illustrate a resurgence of new cases (orange arrow), several weeks after the first wave that is not 
accompanied by a marked increase in death rates. We will see a similar phenomenology in predictions of new cases 
and deaths for the United States in subsequent figures. 
 
 
Dynamic causal modelling 
 
The dynamic causal model used in this report is an extension of a compartmental model of a regional 
outbreak detailed in (Friston et al., 2020). This (epidemic) model is a factorial extension of a conventional 
SEIR (susceptible, exposed, infected, and recovered) model in which the four states7 of the SEIR model 
are unpacked into four factors (location, infection, symptoms, and testing), each with four states. This 
furnishes a 44 = 256-compartmental model that allows for different combinations of states to generate data. 
For example, being infected does not necessarily mean that one has to manifest symptoms. Conversely, one 
can be severely ill without having a viral infection8. Similarly, including a testing factor allows for people 
 
7 We will use State to indicate a State of the United States and state to denote a level of a factor in the generative 
model. 
8 For example, acute respiratory distress due to secondary bacterial pneumonia, which may itself be antimicrobial 
resistant: https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RP-104.pdf. 
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to be contagious but not reported as testing positive for SARS-CoV-29. 
 
The factorial structure of this model exploits conditional independencies among the factors to provide a 
relatively straightforward parameterisation. Technically, it uses a mean field approximation to certain 
dependencies. For example, the probability of developing symptoms depends on, and only on, whether I 
have an infection. However, the probability of becoming infected does not depend on whether I am 
symptomatic or not. The four factors in question are shown schematically in Figure 2 in the form of a 
compartmental model. The accompanying parameters of this compartmental model (that mediate the 
conditional dependencies) are listed in Table 1. This model is described in detail in (Friston et al., 2020) 
and used subsequently to look at herd immunity and lockdown cycles in (Moran et al., 2020). Here, the 
model is equipped with two further features: namely, a loss of immunity over time and a distinction between 
susceptible and non-susceptible members of the population. We equipped the model with a loss of 
immunity, with the following parameter: 
 
exp( 1 )imm imm = −           (1.1) 
 
This controls a slow flux from a state of immunity to a state of susceptibility, under the infection factor. We 
made the provisional assumption that immunity to SARS-CoV-2 resembles the immunity to SARS-CoV-
1. Operationally, we modelled this as a period of immunity with a time constant of 32 months: c.f., (Kissler 
et al., 2020). This parameter was included to repeat simulations under more pessimistic conditions, in which 
immunity could be lost within a few (four) months (c.f., a common cold human coronavirus, HCoV-OC43). 
 
The distinction between susceptible and non-susceptible was modelled by assigning people to a susceptible 
or resistant state, such that they did not participate in the spread of the virus if they were resistant. We 
assumed a priori that half of the total population would be susceptible to infection and estimated the 
proportion of resistant cases under the model10. This can be regarded as a crude approximation to varying 
levels of susceptibility in the population at large and could be further refined as more is learnt about the 
susceptibility to COVID-19 infection; for example, by leveraging regional demographic data. 
 
Numerous viral-evasion mechanisms are known. For example, mutations in the 'resistome' cause 
susceptibility to infection, and other (yet to be identified) mutations cause resistance to infection. (Beutler 
et al., 2007). Though age and comorbidity contribute substantially to fatality rates, the host factors that 
influence resistance or susceptibility to infection with pathogenic human coronaviruses (CoVs) are largely 
unknown but might involve several mechanisms. For example, innate immune responses to CoVs are 
initiated by recognition of double-stranded RNA and induction of interferon, which turns on gene 
expression programs that inhibit viral replication (Heer et al., 2020). Furthermore, epidemiological 
 
9 Undocumented infections may be the source of infection for 79% of documented cases Li, R., Pei, S., Chen, B., 
Song, Y., Zhang, T., Yang, W., Shaman, J., 2020. Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid 
dissemination of novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV2). Science, eabb3221. 
10 This parameter determines the initial conditions and specifies the proportion of the population that do not 
participate in epidemiological transitions. As such, we omit the state of resistance from subsequent figures, for 
clarity. 
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evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2 infection in children is less frequent and severe than in adults: age-
related ACE2 receptor expression might be a relevant host factor (Cristiani et al., 2020). Including a 
distinction between susceptible and resistant enables the model to explain data from the total population, 
as opposed to a susceptible population. This is important when considering models of how the virus is 
spread among regions by movement of people who may or may not be susceptible and therefore capable of 
infecting—and being infected by—others. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Figure 2: the dynamic causal (LIST) model. This schematic summarises the dynamic causal model that is used to 
explain timeseries data in a single region. In brief, it comprises four factors, each with four states (listed in the key on 
the left), giving 256 states or compartments. Regional factors include location, infection, symptom, and testing status 
(the infection state of resistance has been omitted from the schematic for simplicity). The small arrows denote 
transitions among states that are parameterised in terms of the probability of moving from one state to another, every 
day. Black or unlabelled arrows denote a unit probability. Coloured arrows designate transitions that are determined 
by the model parameters (ϴ—please see Table 1).  To suppress visual clutter, the expressions for transition 
probabilities are colour-coded within each factor. The quantities pi are marginal probabilities over the states of the i-
th factor. Crucially, transitions among the states of one factor depend upon other factors. These conditional 
dependencies (highlighted by broken arrows) are illustrated by showing the transition probabilities among the states 
of one factor under the levels of another. For example, the probability that I will move from a state of being 
asymptomatic (Sa) to being symptomatic (Ss) depends upon whether I am infected (Ii and Ic) or not (Is and Im). 
Furthermore, the probability that I will move from ARDS (Sr) to being deceased (Sd) depends upon whether I am 
located in a critical care unit (Lc) or at home (Lh)—and so on. The parameters of the implicit transition probabilities 
are listed in Table 1 and are described in detail in (Friston et al., 2020). A particularly important transition is the 
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probability that I will leave home (i.e., expose myself to more potentially contagious contacts) on any given day; 
namely, social distancing. This is denoted by (1.2), corresponding to equation (1.3) in the main text. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how a single-region (epidemic) model can be used to construct a (pandemic) model that 
encompasses several regions. The key aspect of this factorial extension (i.e., including a region factor) rests 
upon the coupling among regions. Here, people who are not confined in self-isolation (i.e., at home) are 
available to travel with a certain daily probability from one state to another. A priori, this probability is 
based upon the probability that any American citizen will fly from one state to another every day. This can 
be written down as the following transition probability 
 
1
1
( | , )
( | , ),     . .,     
( | , ) ( | , )
( | ,
i k
k t k k ik
i t i i k
t i t i i
t k
N N N
N P work region asymptomatic N
N P work region asymptomatic s t N N
P work region asymptomatic P work region asymptomatic N N
P work region asymptomat

+
+
 =  −
 =  
   = 
= −
 
) ( | , )t k kic P work region asymptomatic N N= + 
  (1.2) 
 
Here, Ni corresponds to the number of people in the i-th State and N  corresponds to the relative number 
of people that are exchanged between States i and k. This construction ensures that the total number of 
people in each state does not change over time. In turn, this constraint means that the flux of people between 
any two States can be parameterised with a single coupling or connectivity parameter,
ik . 
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FIGURE 3 
Figure 3: a multi-region model. This schematic summarises the dynamic causal model used to explain timeseries 
data from multiple regions. This (pandemic) model is composed of several regional (epidemic) models. In brief, the 
model for a single region comprises four factors, each with four states, giving 44 = 256 states or compartments per 
region. These regional models are then assembled to model the coupling among eight regions giving 2568 
compartments. However, due to conditional independencies, this can be treated as a collection of 256 compartmental 
models; providing one links the states of one region to the states of another carefully. Here, this linking or connectivity 
is parameterised in terms of a probability flux or exchange of people among regional populations. The probability that 
I will move from one region to another depends upon whether I am at work (i.e., not at home, Lh) and do not consider 
myself to be ill (i.e., I am asymptomatic, Sa). In short, the exchange between different regional populations is limited 
to the people who are not at home and are consequently in a position to travel. This is illustrated by the arrows in the 
figure that connect the appropriate states. The parameters of interregional coupling correspond to rate constants or 
effective connectivity that ensure the conservation of total numbers in each region. For example, the probability of 
moving to New York from New Jersey is the same as a probability of moving from New Jersey to New York; however, 
the number of people commuting in either direction will depend on the respective population sizes of New Jersey and 
New York.  
 
 
Usually, in these kinds of connectivity models, one considers different sparsity constraints on the coupling 
architecture. One could use Bayesian model comparison based upon the variational free energy (a.k.a. 
evidence lower bound) to test for different connectivity structures (Friston et al., 2015); e.g., full 
connectivity, a serial connectivity based upon spatial distance between states, the time of onset and so on. 
However, for simplicity, we elected to use a model with full connectivity and eliminate redundant 
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connections post hoc, using Bayesian model reduction (Friston et al., 2018). 
 
The second important extension to the epidemic model was the inclusion of a dual criteria social distancing 
process, parameterised as follows: 
 
1
1
( | , ) ( , ) ( , 8)
( | , ) ( , ) ( , 8)
infection location
t t out infected sde CCU sde cap
infection location
t t out infected sde CCU sde cap
P work home asymptomatic p p
P work home asymptomatic q q
     
     
+
+
=    
=    
  (1.3) 
 
The first equality parameterises the probability of going to work in the morning as a function of the marginal 
probabilities of certain states for the region in question, p, while the second has the same functional form 
but takes the marginal probability from all regions, q. These can be regarded as a regional (State) and 
national (Federal) social distancing responses, respectively. It would also be possible to respond based on 
a linear combination of these two formulations, however we limit the simulations presented here to one or 
other of the extremes. The states in question are the probability that any member of the population is 
currently infected or requires critical care. The form of the decreasing threshold (sigmoid) functions that 
constitute this model of social distancing is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Intuitively, this models social distancing as the probability of leaving home, which only attains normal 
levels when two criteria are met. First, the proportion of the population infected with coronavirus must be 
below some threshold and second, the number of people in critical care must be less than some fraction of 
maximum capacity. Equation (1.3) lumps the thresholds together so that there is a single social distancing 
threshold that is applied to both criteria. When the threshold is low (say 1/32) we effectively have a 
lockdown policy that will remain in place until less than 1/32 of the population are deemed to be infected 
and the occupancy of critical care facilities has fallen below 8/32 = ¼ of total capacity. A more liberal 
threshold could be interpreted as a softer social distancing strategy, where certain (non-vulnerable) people 
are allowed to return to school (or work) and some degree of social distancing is maintained when 
commuting or at work (e.g., wearing face masks). 
 
Note that social distancing is modelled as a part of the epidemiological dynamics generating data. In other 
words, it is not an exogenous input or strategic response that enters the model. Rather, it is installed as a 
reactive and adaptive process that best explains the observed data. An interesting twist here is that the 
optimisation of the parameters that shape social distancing are those that best explain the data; namely, the 
social distancing that has been achieved. They are not optimised to minimise some cost function (e.g., 
mortality rates)—they are a measure of what a population actually does when confronted with a pandemic. 
Later, we will simulate different levels of social distancing—by increasing or decreasing the estimated 
threshold—to see what mitigates morbidity; either in terms of cumulative deaths or economic morbidity 
(as measured in terms of lost working days under the location factor).  
 
Finally, we included a back-to-work parameter that allowed people who were immune to be exempt from 
social distancing and return to work. This is a fictive aspect of the model, in the sense that it would rest 
upon knowing whether somebody was immune or not. This enabled us to model the potential benefits of 
being able to measure seroconversion and allow people back to work if they had detectable (and hopefully 
neutralising) antibodies to SARS-CoV-2. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Figure 4: threshold strategies. This figure illustrates the different kinds of social distancing functions that could be 
adopted to model social distancing responses. Both parameterise the degree of social distancing as a function of the 
proportion of the population that are currently infected (and are currently occupying critical care facilities). This 
proportion can, in principle, be estimated directly or indirectly, given current testing capabilities. These social 
distancing functions are decreasing functions of the prevalence of infection (or critical care occupancy). In other 
words, as prevalence increases, the probability of leaving home (e.g., self-isolation) decreases. The two examples 
above are distinguished by the form of this decrease. The (threshold) strategy used in this report is based upon a 
threshold, afforded by the reverse sigmoid function (solid line). Conversely, the (exponent) strategy used in previous 
models (Friston et al., 2020) decreases smoothly as a power function of prevalence (broken line). The functional forms 
are given by the equations in the figure. Please see main text for further details. 
 
 
With this pandemic model in place, we modelled the eight States in America with the greatest number of 
cases of COVID-19, using standard (variational Laplace) Bayesian methods (Friston et al., 2020). We chose 
to analyse eight States because the key information in the accompanying timeseries lies in the form of the 
transients or fluctuations in new cases and deaths. This form is better evinced by larger numbers. Put simply, 
including States that have yet to experience an epidemic provides no useful information that would inform 
the parameters that are shared between States. 
 
One advantage of modelling data from the United States of America is that one can, a priori, assume that 
many factors are conserved from State to State, given the homogeneity of the medical infrastructure within 
America. Unlike the epidemic model, the population size of each state serves as an informative prior on the 
susceptible population size. In other words, previously we estimated the number of people affected by an 
epidemic as an unknown quantity. Here, we try to explain the data in terms of all the population who are 
caught up in the pandemic—an unknown proportion of which may be resistant to infection. Technically, 
this involves placing very precise shrinkage priors on the population size, corresponding to the population 
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of each State. Finally, because each state is likely to have been seeded with one or two infected individuals 
at different times, we modelled the pandemic as ensuing from the epicentre; namely, New York State11. 
This involves estimating the number of people in New York who were infected eight days after records 
began.  
 
To expedite model inversion, we used a further mean field approximation, by assuming conditional 
independence between the between-region (i.e., connectivity) parameters in Table 1A and the within-region 
parameters in Table 1B. This allowed us to estimate the parameters for each region (i.e., State) separately 
and then use the ensuing State-specific estimates to infer the connectivity parameters (and initial case load 
at the epicentre). This greatly finesses the numerics; however, it comes at the price of ignoring conditional 
dependencies between the two sorts of parameters. This completes our description of the model. The next 
section turns to the results of fitting multivariate timeseries of new cases and deaths under this model. 
 
TABLE 1A 
Parameters of the pandemic (multiple region) model, ( , )N C   
 (NB: prior means are for scale parameters exp( ) = ) 
 
Number Parameter Mean Variance  Description 
1 
n  exp(-4) 1/4 Number of initial cases in the epicentre 
2 
ik  exp(-8) 1/16 Population flow between regions 
TABLE 2B 
Parameters of the epidemic (LIST) model and priors, ( , )N C   
 (NB: prior means are for scale parameters exp( ) = ) 
 
Number Parameter Mean Variance  Description 
1 
n  exp(-4) 1/4 Number of initial cases 
2 
r  1/2 1/16 Proportion of resistant cases 
Location     
3 
out  1/3 1/64 Prob(work | home): probability of going out 
4 
sde  1/32 1/128 Social distancing threshold 
5 
cap  16/100000 1/64 CCU capacity threshold (per capita) 
Infection     
 
11 We considered a series of models with sparse connectivity and full connectivity (entertaining initially infected 
cases in one State or all States). We chose to report the full connectivity model to showcase the use of subsequent 
Bayesian model reduction. 
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6 
Rin  4 1/64 Effective number of contacts: home 
7 
Rou  48 1/64 Effective number of contacts: work 
8 
trn  1/4 1/64 Prob(contagion | contact) 
9 1exp( )
inf
inf 
 = −  4inf =  1/64 Infected (pre-contagious) period (days) 
10 1exp( )
con
con 
 = −  4con =  1/64 Contagious period (days) 
11 1exp( )
imm
imm 
 = −  32imm =  1/64 Period of immunity (months) 
Symptoms     
12 11 exp( )
inc
dev 
− = −  8inc =  1/64 Incubation period (days) 
13 
sev  1/128 1/64 Prob(ARDS | symptomatic) 
14 1exp( )
sym
sym 
 = −  5sym =  1/64 Symptomatic period (days) 
15 1exp( )
rds
rds 
 = −  12rds =  1/64 Acute RDS period (days) 
16 
fat  1/2 1/64 Prob(fatality | CCU) 
17 
sur  1/16 1/64 Prob(survival | home) 
Testing     
18 
tft  1/1024 1/4 Threshold: testing capacity (per capita) 
19 
sen  1/1024 1/4 Prob(being tested) (per day) 
20 1exp( )
del
del 
 = −  2del =  1/4 Delay in reporting test results (days) 
21 
tes  1/4 1/4 Prob(tested | uninfected) (per day) 
 
Secondary sources (Huang et al., 2020; Kissler et al., 2020; Mizumoto and Chowell, 2020; Russell et al., 2020; Verity 
et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020b) and: 
• https://www.statista.com/chart/21105/number-of-critical-care-beds-per-100000-inhabitants/ 
• https://www.gov.uk/guidance/coronavirus-COVID-19-information-for-the-public 
• http://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/COVID-19/ 
These prior expectations should be read as the effective rates and time constants as they manifest in a real-world 
setting. For example, a four-day period of contagion is shorter than the period that someone might be infectious 
(Wölfel et al., 2020)12, on the (prior) assumption that they will self-isolate, when they realise they could be contagious. 
Although the scale parameters are implemented as probabilities or rates, they are estimated as log parameters, denoted 
by ln = . 
 
 
12 Shedding of COVID-19 viral RNA from sputum can outlast the end of symptoms. Seroconversion occurs after 6-
12 days but is not necessarily followed by a rapid decline of viral load. 
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Results 
 
This section reviews the within and between-State parameters following model inversion under a regional 
social distancing response. We then use these parameters to predict outcomes that have yet to be observed. 
In the final section, we will repeat these predictions under different social distancing strategies. Our focus 
in this section is on how the second wave, if any, is shaped by social distancing responses and the 
acquisition—and subsequent loss—of immunity. 
 
Figure 5 reports the differences among States in terms of selected parameters for each State, ranging from 
the population size, through to the probability of testing its denizens. The blue bars report the posterior 
expectations, while the pink bars are 90% Bayesian credible intervals. Notice that there is no uncertainty 
about the population sizes because these are known quantities. From the current perspective, the interesting 
thing to note here is the social distancing threshold that varies among States, around 0.03. In other words, 
each State is behaving as if lockdown is invoked when either 3% of the population become infected or 
critical care occupancy approaches 8 · 3% = 24% of total capacity. Interestingly, California appears to have 
the most stringent social distancing response so far, with the lowest threshold. This may be relevant later 
when trying to explain differential mortality rates. 
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FIGURE 5 
 
Figure 5: differences among States. This figure reports the differences among States in terms of selected parameters 
of the generative (epidemic) model, ranging from population size, through to the probability of testing. The blue bars 
represent the posterior expectations, while the pink bars are 90% Bayesian credible intervals. Notice that these 
intervals are not symmetrical about the mean because we are reporting scale parameters—as opposed to log 
parameters. For each parameter, the States showing the smallest and largest values are labelled. For example, New 
Jersey and New York behave as if they had a relaxed social distancing threshold, when compared to California. Please 
see next figure for a key to the States. 
 
 
Figure 6 summarises the estimated connectivity or population exchange between States. The upper right 
panel shows the connectivity among States as an adjacency matrix. The key thing to take from this analysis 
is that nearly all the connections among states have been removed following Bayesian model reduction, 
leaving only reciprocal exchange with New York. Clearly, this is not what is happening in the field. 
However, it is the simplest account of the data at hand. In other words, it is sufficient to describe the current 
data in terms of one epicentre (New York) exchanging infected individuals with the remaining States. In 
this analysis, the greatest flux of people appears to be between New York and California. The question now 
is whether these fluxes have a material impact on cumulative deaths or mortality rates. This sort of question 
can be addressed using a sensitivity analysis.  
 
 
FIGURE 6 
 
Figure 6: connectivity and viral spread. This figure reports the connectivity among states, following Bayesian model 
reduction of a full connectivity model. The upper left panel shows the log evidence of the 256 models with the greatest 
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evidence. A model here constitutes a reduced model in which various combinations of connectivity parameters have 
been removed. The upper right panel shows the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the ensuing Bayesian model 
average, as an adjacency matrix. The elements of this matrix quantify the rate or probability that a State in each column 
will deliver a proportion of its (out-of-home) population to a State in the rows. For example, the greatest flux of people 
is between New York and California. The lower right panel shows the posterior probability of a model with and 
without each of these parameters, based upon Bayesian model comparison. For the connectivity parameters involving 
New York, we can be nearly 100% certain that the model that includes this coupling parameter has greater evidence 
than a model that does not. The insert on the lower left provides a schematic representation of the connectivity, based 
upon these estimates. The heavier connectors correspond to a greater probability of moving between States. 
 
 
A sensitivity analysis involves changing each of the parameters by a small value and measuring the 
consequent change in cumulative deaths, while holding all the other parameters constant. Figure 7 shows 
the results of this analysis for the connectivity parameters of the model that survived Bayesian model 
reduction. Interestingly, the effects of movement between States does not appear to have a consistent effect 
on cumulative deaths. Sometimes increasing commuter traffic decreases overall mortality and sometimes 
it is increased. Having said this, the flux that has the greatest (mitigating) effect on overall mortality is the 
exchange between New York and California. In other words, mixing the populations in New York and 
California would, under this model, save lives. The explanation for these complicated effects rests upon the 
intricate dynamics of latent states that constitute the underlying causes of the pandemic. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
Figure 7: sensitivity analysis. This figure reports the effect of changing each connectivity parameter on 
cumulative deaths over an 18-month period. The upper panel shows the rate of increase (or decrease) in 
cumulative deaths per unit change in the (log) parameters. These sensitivity metrics are based upon a first 
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order Taylor expansion about the maximum a posteriori values shown in the lower panel. The blue bars 
correspond to the most likely estimate and the pink bars report the 90% credible intervals. Interestingly, the 
effects of connectivity or coupling among States are mixed. In some instances, increasing the exchange 
between one State and another will increase or decrease overall death rates; presumably, based upon the 
respective capacity of different states to respond to pressure on their clinical care capacities. 
 
 
Figure 8 provides a prediction of the future course of the pandemic in each of the eight States. The picture 
that emerges here is what one might expect from a loosely coupled oscillator model (here, a factorial 
compartmental model of ensemble dynamics). Notable aspects of these predictions are that New York 
experiences a marked peak in death rates early in the epidemic, whereas other States follow after a week or 
so. In terms of the epidemiology, an interesting feature of these predictions is a second peak in death rates 
at around 38 weeks (i.e., 28 weeks after the first peak). Another aspect of these predictions is the large 
variability in death rates between States. Much of this variability can be accounted for by differences in 
populations; however, as shown in the lower right panel, mortality rates (as estimated by the expected 
number of deaths in one year divided by the population of each State) still show a substantial variation. For 
example, the mortality rate in New York is estimated to be just over 0.1%, while it is much smaller in 
California. Recall that these predictions are entirely conditioned upon the model and available data. Having 
said this, the currently available peak death rates in New York and California testify to some difference that 
cannot be explained in terms of population sizes, e.g., climactic effects on transmission strength that 
mediate seasonal influences (Kissler et al., 2020). Alternatively, the differential social distancing estimates 
in New York and California (see Figure 5) may speak to regional or cultural differences (e.g., the prevalence 
of high density, low-cost housing or ethnic differences in communal activities). 
 
The cumulative deaths under this particular model are consistent with predictions based upon other 
modelling work. For example, at 20 weeks, the cumulative deaths in the United States has—on some 
conservative estimates—been reported in the media to be around 60,00013. The eight States here constitute 
119 million people (about a third of the population). The cumulative deaths within these States are estimated 
to be about 48,000, under the current model. One potentially reassuring aspect of these results is that 
predicted (annual) mortality rates in most States is, overall, less than that attributable to seasonal influenza 
(0.1%) (Paget et al., 2019). Indeed, typical mortality rates appear to be in the order of 0.05% or less. This 
is in line with projections based upon global data and countries who experienced an early epidemic, such 
as Italy. 
 
 
13 Consistently, across countries, excess death is higher than reported COVID-19 deaths: in many cases deaths in 
care homes or in the home are not reported systematically as COVID-19 related. For example, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/21/world/coronavirus-missing-deaths.html 
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FIGURE 8 
 
Figure 8: predicted mortality rates. This figure reports the predicted trajectory of death rates for each State. The 
upper panels show the predicted time course of death rates per day under a social distancing strategy based upon 
regional estimates of prevalence. The expected rates are shown as blue lines, while the shaded blue areas correspond 
to 90% Bayesian credible intervals. The dots report empirical data observed to date. The same data are shown in the 
upper right panel after scaling the Y axis. This enables the second wave of deaths—predicted under this model—to 
be seen more clearly, about 28 weeks following the first wave. The lower left panel shows the cumulative deaths in 
each State, based upon these predictions, in terms of the total expectation (blue bars) and accompanying 90% credible 
intervals (pink bars). These projections reflect differences among the States in terms of their population—and their 
response to the influx and subsequent explosion of infected cases. The middle right panel adjusts for differences in 
the population by expressing mortality rates (per year) as a percentage of the population of each state. The broken 
horizontal line corresponds roughly to the mortality rate of seasonal influenza. The lower panel shows the cumulative 
deaths over all States, in terms of the posterior expectation (blue line) and confidence intervals (shaded area). The 
(black dots) correspond to empirical data. The confidence intervals in these figures should not be overinterpreted: they 
were approximated (under large-number assumptions) by a Poisson distribution. This approximation was used purely 
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for computational expediency (and was not used during model inversion). 
 
 
The underlying causes of the (predicted) outcomes in Figure 8 are shown in Figure 9. The predicted 
outcomes are reproduced in the upper panels, in terms of rates per day (upper left panel) and cumulative 
cases and deaths (upper right panel). In addition, the model has generated the occupancy of critical care 
unit beds that accompanies these State-specific predictions. The lines correspond to the predicted numbers 
under a model with a regional social distancing strategy. The dots correspond to the data observed so far. 
These trajectories are generated by fluctuations in the probability of being away from home (i.e., denoted 
by the state work, Lw), whether one is infectious or not, the clinical expression of the infection and the 
probability that one tests negative or positive. A key aspect of these results is the rapid acquisition of herd 
immunity to levels of about 30% at the peak of the first wave (see yellow lines in the middle right panel of 
Figure 9). This rise is most pronounced during the early phase of the pandemic that shows subsequent 
fluctuations due to movement between states and a mild loss of immunity. 
 
One can see two sorts of second wave, in terms of new cases and deaths in the upper left panel. The first is 
an early secondary peak about four weeks after the first peak (orange arrow). This is particularly evident in 
the new cases predicted for New York. This coincides with a relaxation of social distancing and a 
concomitant influx of people from other States (compare this with the second wave of new cases in Figure 
1). However, there is a more protracted and pronounced second wave after 28 weeks (blue arrow) that 
induces a fluctuation in social distancing behaviour; again, most evident in New York. The mechanism for 
this second peak is due to the endogenous loss of immunity. Increasing the period of immunity from 32 
months to 8 years delays this peak by about 20 weeks (data not shown). As we will see next, decreasing the 
period of immunity to 4 months accelerates the second peak so that it encroaches on the first.  
 
Finally, note that social distancing never disappears, i.e., the blue lines reporting the probability of leaving 
home (left middle panel) never quite return to their pre-pandemic levels. In other words, there is a persistent 
failure to return to levels of work prior to the pandemic. This persistent change in social distancing 
behaviour is an integral part of the endemic equilibrium simulated in these analyses. Put simply, there is an 
equilibrium that constitutes the endpoint of any ‘exit strategy’—and this equilibrium will be attained at 
about 40 weeks (i.e., 10 months) following the onset of the pandemic. However, this will not be a return to 
normal life; it will be a way of ‘living with COVID-19’. This way of living is comfortably within the 
resources of our ability to provide critical care for those people who need it. Furthermore, as noted above, 
this endemic equilibrium entails mortality rates due to COVID-19 that are less than half those due to 
seasonal influenza. It should be reiterated that these are just model predictions and should not be taken 
literally. They should be read as the kind of predictions that can be made with suitable modelling14. 
 
A key aspect of the simulation results is that new cases in the second wave are not necessarily accompanied 
by marked increases in daily death rates. Furthermore, the amplitude of the second wave, under this model, 
is much less than that of the first. This reflects the immunity acquired during the first wave. In other words, 
the context in which the second wave emerges is contextualised by the immunological memory of the first 
exposure to the virus. In these simulations, herd immunity is between 40% and 70%. These simulations can 
 
14 Note also that we have not included any therapeutic advances or vaccination programs in this model. 
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be compared with the predictions of seasonal re-emergencies of COVID-19, based upon models that factor 
in seasonal variations in transmission, of the kind associated with seasonal influenza. For example, short 
term immunity on the order of 10 months (similar to HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1) would engender 
annual SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks, while longer-term immunity (24 months) favours biennial outbreaks 
(Kissler et al., 2020). 
 
The simulations above should be compared with the corresponding simulations in Figure 10 under short 
term immunity. Here, we repeated the analysis but changed the period of immunity from 32 months to 4 
months. In this scenario, herd immunity declines rapidly, and endemic equilibrium is reached almost as 
soon as the first wave subsides. This endemic equilibrium is probably not sustainable: although the demand 
for critical care does not exceed total capacity, this demand is mitigated by persistent social distancing. In 
turn, this social distancing precludes any meaningful return to work (in the majority of States simulated, 
only 8% or less of the population returns to work). On the assumption that the ensuing damage to social 
and economic infrastructure is untenable, the scenario of losing immunity within months is difficult to 
countenance. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9 
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Figure 9: the pandemic under long-term immunity (32 months). This figure reports the predicted outcomes and 
underlying latent states generating those outcomes over a one-year period, under a regional social distancing strategy. 
The upper panels show some key outcomes, some of which are measurable. Here, daily death rates are shown in blue, 
new cases in red and CCU occupancy in orange. The lines correspond to the predictions of the model, while the dots 
are empirical data available at the time of writing (18th of April 2020). The dotted line in the upper left panel 
corresponds to the typical critical care capacity of a large city. The same results are shown on the upper right panel in 
terms of cumulative new cases (red) and deaths (blue). The underlying or latent causes of this mortality are shown in 
the lower panels. These are organised according to the four factors of the generative model. In each panel, the latent 
states are plotted for the eight States considered in this analysis. The location factor shows that, under this strategy, 
the number of people away from the home (or equivalent location) decreases sharply at the onset of the outbreak and 
then recovers slowly over the ensuing weeks. In terms of infection, there is a rapid acquisition of immunity, to varying 
levels between 40% and 80% over the first months of the pandemic. At any one time, about 18% or less of the 
population is either infected or infectious. In terms of the clinical expression of these infections, 8% percent or less of 
people will experience symptoms and a small minority will progress to acute respiratory distress, from which they 
may recover or die. Under this model, positive test results for the virus (based on buccal swabs) accumulate over time 
as more and more people are tested. In the initial phases of the outbreak, most people are negative. However, during 
the onset of the pandemic about a half to a third of people tested are positive. This proportion declines over the ensuing 
months. 
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FIGURE 10 
 
Figure 10Figure 9: the pandemic under short-term immunity (4 months). This figure uses the same format as the 
previous figure. The only difference here is that we decreased the period of immunity from 32 months to 4 months. 
 
The emerging picture is that two things are crucially important in shaping the long-term trajectory of the 
pandemic. First, the acquisition of herd immunity and second, the rate at which immunity is lost. At present, 
the second factor is difficult to assess empirically, which is why cases of reinfection would be so telling15. 
Documented cases of reinfection speak to a short-term immunity. At the time of writing, there is little 
evidence to suggest reinfection is a characteristic of COVID-19. Indeed, the evidence points in the other 
direction (Bao et al., 2020). So, is there any evidence for a rapid acquisition of herd immunity? At the time 
of writing, there are no published reports; however, preprints and local media have identified apposite 
studies in California. These studies are in a position to provide important data that will endorse or constrain 
the modelling of immunity. Figure 11 shows the predicted immunity for people in California shown in 
 
15 Note that that a confirmed reinfection is distinct from a second positive test, which might be expected given the 
false positive (and negative) rates of many tests. 
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Figure 9. These predictions are not inconsistent with early reports of antibody testing in California based 
upon preprints (Bendavid et al., 2020)16 and local media reports17, shown as confidence intervals (vertical 
bars) and point estimates (red dot) respectively. Although the consilience should not be overinterpreted, 
these provisional findings are in line with the model predictions; although the Santa Clara prevalence of 
antibodies is about half what would have been predicted on the basis of the current model. As noted in the 
LA Times, these results suggest: 
 
“[t]he fatality rate may be much lower than previously thought. But although the virus may be more 
widespread, the infection rate still falls far short of herd immunity that, absent a vaccine, would be key to 
return to normal life.” (https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-20/coronavirus-serology-
testing-la-county) 
 
In fact, on the current reading of the model predictions, this prevalence of seropositive cases in California 
is consistent with the acquisition of herd immunity over the next few weeks. Clearly, it would be 
reassuring—if not imperative—to have more definitive data from other States (or countries) to track herd 
immunity as it develops. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 11 
 
16 The authors measured the seroprevalence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 in Santa Clara County on the third and 
fourth of April 2020, using a lateral flow immunoassay. Under three scenarios for their test performance, the 
population prevalence of COVID-19 in Santa Clara ranged from 2.49% (95CI 1.80-3.17%) to 4.16% (2.58-5.70%). 
17 Initial results from the first large-scale study tracking the spread of the coronavirus in LA county found that 4.1% 
of adults have antibodies. This translates to roughly 221,000 to 442,000 adults who have recovered from an 
infection. LA county had reported fewer than 8,000 cases at that time. Our thanks to Virginia Webber for forwarding 
this material. 
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Figure 11: predicted and observed levels of immunity. This figure reproduces the results of Figure 9, with a focus 
on the states of the infection factor. The blue line reports the expected percentage of the population who are infected 
in California, up until the date of writing. The red line shows the prevalence of contagious or infectious people that 
follows a few days later. The yellow line reports the acquisition of immunity; namely, the number of people who have 
moved from a contagious state to an immune state. The two bars represent the 90% confidence intervals from an early 
report from Santa Clara. The red dot corresponds to the estimated prevalence of immunity according to a local media 
report. Please see main text for details. 
 
In summary, the acquiring and maintaining critical levels of immunity are crucial factors in determining 
the course of the pandemic over the next few months. Put simply, the rate at which we move to (a potentially 
catastrophic) endemic equilibrium will be much faster if immunity is lost quickly (via antigenic drift or 
mixing of the immune pool)— sufficiently quickly to preclude a second wave. This concludes our summary 
of the results under models of regional social distancing. In the next section, we turn to other aspects of 
strategic responses and ask what are the best mitigation strategies, under the current model? 
 
 
Mitigation strategies 
 
In this section, we use the parameter estimates from the DCM to integrate 18 months into the future and 
record various outcomes under distinct social distancing strategies. The parameters of these strategies are 
estimated from empirical data; however, their functional form is a question of model selection. Having said 
this, given that there is only data from the initial phase of the pandemic, model comparison may be best left 
until after the epidemic has run its course. In the interim, we can examine the effect of strategic responses 
on metrics of interest; here, the total number of deaths, the total number of working days and the peak 
occupancy of critical care facilities. We will consider mitigation strategies that are driven by the prevalence 
of infection in any given State or whether national (i.e., Federal) measures of prevalence inform our 
behaviour. First, we look at the effect of relaxing social distancing (by increasing the social distancing 
threshold) and then repeat the analysis under a Federal policy. 
 
Figure 12 shows the results of simulations under 16 levels of social distancing based upon regional 
prevalence. The different levels were simulated by scaling the social distancing threshold of about 3% in 
Figure 5 from very small values (around 0.05%) to very large values (around 100%). Figure 12 uses the 
same format as previous figures to quantify the rate of new cases and deaths per day (upper left panel), 
cumulated cases (upper right panel) and the underlying or latent causes (lower four panels). Here, the lines 
report the average rates and probabilities over States, for different levels of social distancing. With stringent 
social distancing (i.e., a low threshold) the initial relaxing of the lockdown after the first wave is quickly 
reversed as new cases start to accumulate. The probability of returning to work peaks at about 20% and 
then falls to negligible levels as the months pass. In this scenario, the second wave is delayed until about 
60 weeks following the first wave. As social distancing is relaxed by increasing the threshold to its posterior 
estimate from the original model estimation, the return to work approaches endemic equilibria at 
successively higher levels, until, at low levels of social distancing (high thresholds) there is hardly any 
fluctuation in the probability of being found at work. At the same time, a second peak at around 40 weeks 
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(30 weeks after the first peak) emerges and cumulative cases and deaths rise more quickly over the months. 
This spectrum of long-term trajectories is summarised by the green and blue arrows illustrating the 
suppression of a second wave at 70 weeks and the emergence of an earlier wave at 40 weeks. 
 
The key aspect of these simulations is that there is a balance between an overzealous lockdown that 
precludes any meaningful return to work and a capricious social distancing strategy that releases a second 
wave a few months after the first. This effect of social distancing is illustrated more explicitly in Figure 13 
 
  
FIGURE 12 
 
Figure 12: the effect of social distancing. This figure shows the results of simulations under different levels of social 
distancing, based upon regional prevalence. This figure uses the same format as previous figures, to illustrate the rate 
of new cases and deaths per day (upper left panel), accumulated cases (upper right panel) and the underlying or latent 
causes (lower four panels). Here, the lines report the average rates and probabilities over States, for different levels of 
social distancing. These levels were evaluated in 16 steps by scaling the posterior expectation of the social distancing 
thresholds from exp(-4) to exp(4) = 54.6. The key effects of this scaling are summarised in the next figure. 
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Figure 13 plots the cumulative deaths, working days and lost weeks as a function of the (logarithmic) 
deviation from an estimated social distancing threshold of about 3%. As one might intuit, increasing the 
threshold monotonically increases the number of working days at the expense of cumulative deaths, ranging 
across the eight states from about 48,000 to 62,000, over a period of 18 months. Changing the threshold for 
social distancing has a nonlinear aspect. This can be evinced more clearly by plotting the weeks lost due to 
lockdown as a function of the (logarithmic) changes in threshold. Weeks lost was quantified in terms of the 
number of weeks, over 18 months, during which the probability of being at work was less than 8%. The 
lower left panel of Figure 13 highlights the switch from lockdown strategies—which preclude a long-term 
return to work—to those that permit near-normal social distancing in the long term. Interestingly, the 
empirical (posterior expectation) estimate of social distancing based upon the data is characterised by a 
threshold that is close to the transition between the two kind of strategies. Again, as one might intuit, these 
simulations speak to a trade-off between lives and weeks lost due to the pandemic—and our adaptive 
response (see lower right panel). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13 
 
Figure 13: lost lives and weeks. This figure summarises the key effects of social distancing on cumulative deaths 
and working days lost due to the virus. The upper panels plot the cumulative deaths and days at work under different 
levels of social distancing. As in the previous figure, social distancing was evaluated over 16 levels by scaling the 
threshold estimated for each State. In terms of log parameters, this corresponds to adding or subtracting a change 
(between -4 and +4 natural units). In this figure, social distancing is expressed in terms of these changes, where zero 
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corresponds to no change from the (posterior) estimates of the previous section. The lower panel provides another 
perspective on working days lost by calculating the number of lost weeks—defined operationally as the number of 
weeks during which the probability of going to work was less than 8%. The final (lower right) panel plots cumulative 
deaths against weeks lost. This illustrates the trade-off between the loss of life and working weeks—reflected in the 
decreasing monotonic relationship between these two outcomes. 
 
 
Finally, we repeated the above analysis under regional and national strategies, using high (1/4) and low 
(1/32) social distancing thresholds. Figure 14 (upper row) shows the effects of the four kinds of strategy on 
cumulative deaths, total number of working days and peak CCU occupancy. It is apparent that a hard (low 
threshold) strategy reduces deaths and frees up working days to a greater extent than soft (high threshold) 
strategies. Interestingly, a regional response strategy based on local prevalence rates incurs fewer deaths 
with a slight increase in CCU occupancy. There is no discernible difference between a regional and national 
strategy on working days. 
 
The middle row shows the same results but when immunity is lost over four months, as opposed to 32 
months. As one might intuit, increasing the rate at which immunity is lost substantially increases death rates 
and other costs. In this scenario, the impact of a hard (low threshold) lockdown strategy on cumulative 
deaths is more marked. And the relative benefit of a regional versus national policy is more pronounced. 
This is at the expense of damage to the economy, in terms of the relative number of days lost. Total CCU 
occupancy is largely unaffected with short-term immunity (because the loss of immunity only affects the 
epidemiology after it is acquired during the first peak). 
 
The lower row reproduces the upper row, with the inclusion of a back-to-work policy, in which people who 
were seropositive are allowed to leave the home. The point made by these simulations is that a back-to-
work policy has limited effects on mortality rates18 or peak CCU occupancy but greatly ameliorates the 
economic damage entailed by the lost working days.  
 
 
18 Although it appears to reverse the effect of a regional versus national policy. 
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FIGURE 14 
Figure 14: different strategies evaluated. These bar charts report the effects of different strategies on cumulative 
deaths (left column), total number of working days (middle column) and peak occupancy of CCU (right column). The 
top row shows simulation results based upon the parameters used in the previous figures. One can see that a low 
threshold (lockdown) strategy generally reduces cumulative deaths and working days lost to the economy, while 
augmenting peak CCU occupancy. The middle row reproduces the same analysis but under more pessimistic 
assumptions about the retention of immunity. Specifically, we reduced the time constant for retaining immunity from 
32 months to 4 months. Under this scenario, death rates increase dramatically (approximately doubling), with an 
accompanying loss of working days. Peak CCU is largely unaffected, because this parameter determines long-term 
outcomes or trajectories as opposed to initial responses. The lower row shows the equivalent results when including 
a back-to-work policy based upon serological testing. The only effect of this, under the current model, is to exacerbate 
the effect of a hard versus relaxed social distancing strategy on the number of working days lost. This follows because 
returning people who are immune to the community has no effect on morbidity or for critical care; however, it does 
take the pressure off the economy. 
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Conclusion 
 
This report describes an extension of a single region (epidemic) model that furnishes a (pandemic) model 
of regions that collectively participate in a pandemic. Our focus has been on the genesis of a second wave 
of new cases—and potential deaths—due to the loss of immunity within a regional population and the influx 
of people from other regions. We have showcased this model by applying it to statistics from the United 
States, treating each State as a separable region. When using the optimised model parameters one can 
simulate the impact of various strategies or (non-pharmaceutical) responses.  
 
If one subscribes to the modelling in this report, then there are several narratives one could entertain. These 
depend sensitively on the rate at which the immunity is lost. If SARS-CoV-2 confers immunity that lasts 
for years, the following narrative might be appropriate: 
 
“Endemic equilibrium will be reached by the end of the year, by which time COVID-19 will become 
‘another way to die’. COVID-19 will account for a small proportion of deaths—with mortality rates that 
are less than seasonal influenza (approximately 1/3). This state of affairs rests upon an adaptive (i.e., 
reactive) response to intervening fluctuations in the prevalence of infection (and demands upon critical 
care). Operationally, this response could be characterised by social distancing when either the prevalence 
of infection in the population exceeds 3% for the number of COVID-19 patients in critical care surpasses 
a quarter of maximum capacity. Comprehensive social distancing (i.e. lockdown) is currently in force and 
will last, on average, about 7.5 weeks in each affected region. For most countries, at the time of writing, 
this suggests a relaxing of lockdown in 3 weeks.  
 
However, this relaxation will not return to pre-pandemic levels of interpersonal contact. In other words, 
there will be an enduring pressure to reduce interpersonal contact, which will reduce the time spent in the 
company of others by 5% or less. The road to equilibrium will be relatively smooth with a slight bump 
(second wave) at about seven months following the initial outbreak (i.e., November). This will not require 
lockdown but there will be an appreciable increase in the number of cases and critical care uptake. This 
second wave should last for about five weeks and may be confounded by the onset of a flu season.” 
 
Under this narrative, social distancing will become ‘a way of living’ with COVID-19 and reflect changing 
attitudes to prosocial behaviour; very much like our attitudes to recycling, smoking or outdated and 
dangerous practices, such as the use of laudanum or mercury in the Victorian age. For example, unnecessary 
commuting and international meetings may be seen as antisocial and unhygienic. Similarly, shaking hands 
may become as socially sanctioned as frotteurism. In short, changing attitudes, affordances and dispositions 
may be sufficient social distancing mechanisms to guarantee an endemic equilibrium. Note that the above 
narrative makes no mention of ‘exit strategies’, vaccination, or anti-viral therapy. This is because strategic 
responses are modelled as an inherent part of the epidemiology. In other words, they are treated as part of 
the process as a reactive strategy, as opposed to a proactive strategy. This does not mean that governments 
are under no pressure to declare their exit strategies. Rather, this declaration is part of the process of 
changing attitudes to social behaviour. 
 
As in (Friston et al., 2020), this narrative is not a prediction. It is a concrete example of the kind of prediction 
on offer, with a suitably formulated and informed epidemiological model that installs social behaviour into 
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the dynamics. This particular narrative depends on long-lasting immunity. A different story would be told 
if immunity to SARS-CoV-2 is lost within months. This speaks to two pressing issues. First, has the first 
wave induced a substantive herd immunity predicted by the DCM? Second, if this immunity has been 
induced, how long will it last? The answer to the first question should be available within the next few 
weeks, as studies assessing community levels of seroconversion appear. The answer to the second question 
is more vexed because—from a purely epidemiological perspective—one might have to wait and see (given 
the many factors that determine the loss of immunity and potential variation within different cohorts). In 
the final report of this series, we will estimate the period of immunity by comparing models over a range 
of short-term immunity, in terms of their model evidence. At some point over the next month or so, there 
should be sufficient data to render this model comparison sufficiently definitive to estimate the effective 
period of immunity one can expect. 
 
As with all dynamic causal modelling studies, everything is entirely conditioned upon the models that have 
been evaluated in terms of their evidence. In this report, the aim of the modelling is not to provide 
predictions or guidance per se—it is to show that such predictions are possible under a suitably configured 
model using state-of-the-art variational Bayesian model inversion and reduction. In other words, one can 
reproduce these analyses under different models or prior assumptions in a few minutes on a personal 
computer. This allows one to explore different models in an efficient fashion; thereby treating the modelling 
as hypotheses testing, as more data becomes available. Being able to identify the best hypothesis or model—
in terms of its parameterisation of structure—is potentially important. This is because the model and 
(maximum a posteriori) parameters can then form the basis of a prediction about data that has not yet been 
observed, i.e., the future. In this light, we will not list the shortcomings of this particular model. Any 
‘shortcoming’ is just a statement of an alternative model that can be included in the model comparison 
procedure to optimise the model in and of itself. 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this modelling is its focus on herd immunity and the notion of an 
adaptive or reactive strategy. As in our provisional modelling of a single outbreak in a single region, the 
passage from the onset of an outbreak to endemic equilibrium depends on establishing herd immunity to a 
greater or lesser extent. This underwrites the repeated call for a greater understanding of the virology and 
immunology of COVID-19. Not only will this speak to therapeutic interventions, but simply being able to 
measure the proportion of individuals in a population who are immune would provide informative 
constraints on modelling—and subsequent projections. The second aspect—of adaptive social distancing— 
can be contrasted with other formulations that prescribe a fixed pattern of social distancing. For example, 
a sawtooth or intermittent social distancing that enables the acquisition of herd immunity without 
overwhelming critical care capacity (Ferguson et al., 2006). Both adaptive and proactive schedules (e.g., 
encouraging the use of facemasks) have their merits and could be evaluated using the procedures outlined 
above.  
 
Adaptive strategies provide a quantitative and formal guideline for personal and governmental responses 
as the pandemic develops. In other words, the response becomes part of the ensemble dynamics that 
determine the eventual outcome. A pragmatic advantage of adaptive strategies (see Figure 4) is that they 
can be operationalised given available estimates of the prevalence. For a threshold strategy, one can simply 
revert to one mode of social distancing or another, whenever a particular threshold is passed. An interesting 
perspective on adaptive strategies follows from the fact that—in the model—they are an integral part of the 
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process. In other fields, this corresponds to the notion of Chaos control; e.g., (Rose, 2014) and may yield 
to an optimal control theoretic treatment (Fleming and Sheu, 2002; Kappen, 2005; Todorov and Jordan, 
2002). In other words, the optimal policy can be treated very much like an engineering problem or, indeed, 
an active inference problem. This brings us to our last point. 
 
In closing, there is one perspective on applications of generative models to pandemics that touches on 
(unrelated) work in theoretical neurobiology. This work tries to understand the behaviour of sentient 
systems, such as ourselves, in terms of active inference and the optimisation of variational free energy 
associated with our internal world models (Parr and Friston, 2018). On this view, using a generative model 
of a pandemic to inform policies becomes formally identical to the imperatives that underwrite active 
inference (Clark, 2016; Hohwy, 2013). In brief, these imperatives are to bring about those situations that 
we find the least surprising; namely, that we all elude death and return to normal. 
 
 
 
Software note 
The figures in this report can be reproduced using annotated (MATLAB/Octave) code that is available as 
part of the free and open source academic software SPM (https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), released 
under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 or later. The routines are called by a 
demonstration script that can be invoked by typing >> DEM_COVID_X at the MATLAB prompt. At the 
time of writing, these routines are undergoing software validation in our internal source version control 
system—that will be released in the next public release of SPM (and via GitHub 
at https://github.com/spm/). In the interim, please see https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/COVID-19/. 
 
The data used in this technical report are available for academic research purposes from the 2019 Novel 
Coronavirus COVID-19 (2019-nCoV) Data Repository by Johns Hopkins CSSE, hosted on GitHub at 
https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19. The time series tables from States in America used in 
this report are stored in files time_series_COVID19_confirmed_US.csv and 
time_series_COVID19_deaths_US.csv. 
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